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____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-12-cv-00604) 
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 8, 2015 
 
Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 




           ___________
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





Pro se appellants Nina and Mazen Shahin appeal the District Court’s order 
dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction.  For the reasons detailed below, we 
will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 This case concerns the Shahins’ challenge to the 2010 assessment of their real 
property in Dover, Delaware.  In 2002, the Shahins purchased the property for $223,000; 
in 2010, it was reassessed at $286,700.  As a result, the property tax the Shahins owed on 
the property increased from $839.85 in 2009 to $968.47 in 2010. 
 The Shahins appealed the assessment to the City of Dover Board of Assessment, 
which denied relief.  They appealed that decision to the Delaware Superior Court.  Before 
the Superior Court, in addition to arguing that the assessment was inflated, the Shahins 
claimed, for the first time, that the defendants-assessors had discriminated against them 
on the basis of their race and national origin.  The Superior Court affirmed the 
Assessment Board’s judgment, concluding, among other things, that the Shahins had 
presented no evidence to support their claims of discrimination.  See Shahin v. City of 
Dover Bd. of Assessment, Civ. A. No. K10A-06-002JTV, 2011 WL 704490, at *3 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2011) (non-precedential).  The Shahins then appealed to the Delaware 
Supreme Court, which likewise affirmed.  That Court declined to address the 
discrimination claims because the Shahins had not first presented them to the Assessment 
Board.  See Shahin v. City of Dover, 31 A.3d 77, 2011 WL 4055405, at *2 (Del. Sept. 
12, 2011) (table). 
3 
 
 The Shahins then filed a complaint in the District Court.  Citing Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Shahins again 
alleged that the defendants had performed the assessment in a discriminatory manner.  
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.  The District Court dismissed the 
complaint, concluding that the Tax Injunction Act deprived it of jurisdiction over the 
Shahins’ claims.  The Shahins filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de novo review over 
the District Court’s order.  See Landsman & Funk P.C. v. Skinder–Strauss Assocs., 640 
F.3d 72, 75 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case.  The Tax Injunction 
Act provides that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the 
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and 
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”  28 U.S.C. § 1341.  While 
§ 1341 speaks only in terms of equitable relief, principles of comity also bar actions 
seeking damages.  See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 
100, 107 (1981).  Thus, “a federal court cannot entertain a suit posing either an equitable 
or a legal challenge to state or local taxes” if the state provides an adequate remedy.  
Kerns v. Dukes, 153 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1998).   
 Here, the Shahins’ challenge to the property assessment falls squarely within 
§ 1341’s ambit.  See Gass v. Cnty. of Allegheny, Pa., 371 F.3d 134, 136-37 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Moreover, we have previously held that “the courts of Delaware can indeed 
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provide the forms of judicial inquiry and (as appropriate) judicial remedy that meet the 
requirements of the Tax Injunction Act and the principles of comity.”  Kerns, 153 F.3d at 
103.  That conclusion is supported by the procedural history of this case — the Delaware 
Superior Court expressly considered the Shahins’ “claims of discrimination against 
foreign-born home owners” and rejected them on the merits, concluding that the Shahins 
had “introduced no evidence to support these claims.”  Shahin, 2011 WL 704490, at *3.  
The adequacy of the remedy is not undermined by the fact that the Superior Court denied 
relief on the merits and the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the Shahins had not 
properly preserved their claims.  See Sacks Bros. Loan Co. v. Cunningham, 578 F.2d 
172, 175 (7th Cir. 1978).  We therefore agree with the District Court that the Tax 
Injunction Act bars the Shahins’ claims.1 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
                                              
1 In light of this determination, the District Court did not err in denying the Shahins’ 
other filings, including their motion for class certification. 
